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Part III
Farm Price  and Income  Supports
Because  of the  wide  interest  in  farm  price  and income  sup-
ports,  a major topic  in extension  teaching in agricultural  policy
has  pertained  to  this  problem.  The  subcommittee  assigned  to
this  topic  recognized  the  comprehensive  analysis  provided  in
the  publication  of  the  special  committee  report  sponsored  by
the  Farm  Foundation,  entitled  "Turning  the  Searchlight  on
Farm Policy."  The  following statements  are  intended to further
assist  agricultural  extension  workers  in  preparing  material  to
be used in developing a better public understanding  of the issues
involved  in agricultural  price  and  income  policies.
FARM  PRICE  AND  INCOME  SUPPORTS
THE  LEVELS  AND  METHODS
By  C. B. Ratchford
(Presented to the Conference by M.  S.  Williams)
INTRODUCTION
The  primary  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  discuss  the  alter-
native  levels  and  methods  of  supporting  farm  prices  and  in-
comes.  Before  a  discussion  of  the  levels  and methods  is  begun,
criteria  for  appraising  price  and  income  supports  will  be  dis-
cussed.  Also  specific  programs  which  have  either  been  tried  or
proposed  will  be  outlined.  The  alternative  programs  will  be
appraised  by huddle  groups,  using the  criteria  as yardsticks.
In this  paper  it  is assumed  that some  kind  of price  and/or
income  supports  is  desirable.  Also,  the  discussion  is  aimed  at
supports  for  the commercial  farmer.  It  is  generally  recognized
that the  low-income  or subsistence  farmer  is  a  special  problem
and that programs designed  for  the commercial  farmer  do  little
to  aid  the  low-income  farmer.
CRITERIA  FOR  APPRAISING  PRICE  AND  INCOME  SUPPORTS
There  are  always  differences  of  opinion  about  a  particular
program  or policy.  Some  kind of yardstick  must  be used  if the
program is to be appraised  and the validity of the arguments  for
and against the program or policy  is to be determined. The yard-
stick  used should be  acceptable  not only  to  the  proponents  and
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listed  ten criteria to be used in the appraisal  of price and income
supports.  The criteria are not basically different  from those pre-
sented  by  several  other  workers  in  the  field.'  I  believe  they
would be generally accepted as yardsticks for policy appraisal not
only by economists but by the groups which make up our society.
The  ten  criteria  for  appraising  price  and  income  support
programs  are listed  below. 2 A program  should:
(1)  STABILIZE  INCOME  AND  PRODUCTION.  Income  instability
arises  from  fluctuations  in  prices  and/or  production.  A  price
and income support program should prevent undue fluctuations
in prices and should help prevent the need for drastic short-time
production  changes,  which  are  difficult  to  make,  are  costly  to
the  farmer  and  to  society,  and  frequently  are  in  conflict  with
long-run  goals.  "Stabilize"  as  used  in  this  criterion  does  not
mean  preventing  any  change,  but  it  means  preventing  sudden
changes and  changes which  do not  make economic  sense.
(2)  ENCOURAGE  A PRODUCTION  OF  EACH  COMMODITY  WHICH
MEETS  THE  NEEDS  OF  THE  COUNTRY  FOR  THE  COMMODITY  WITH-
OUT CREATING  A  SURPLUS.  "Needs"  include current domestic  and
export  requirements,  a  reasonable  carry-over,  plus  a  stockpile
for  national  security  in  some  cases.  The  criterion  specifically
refers  to an adequate  production,  but no  surplus,  for  each  and
every  commodity,  and  takes  into  consideration  the  changes  in
consumer  demand  over time.
iSee papers presented  at the 1951  Policy  Conference  by George  Westcott and C.  B. Ratch-
ford,  which  are  published  in  Increasing Our Understanding of  Public Problems and
Policies, a  paper  presented  by  H.  C.  M.  Case  at  the  1950  National  Policy  Conference,
which  is  published  in  Educational and Methods  Conference in Public Policy,  and  the
Farm  Foundation  report,  Turning the Searchlight on Farm Policy.
2Most  of  the ten  criteria  are included  either  directly  or  by  inference  in  the  ten criteria
listed  in  the  Farm  Foundation  report,  but  the  amount  of  emphasis  given  to  some  of
the  criteria  differs. It  appears  to the  author  that  the Farm  Foundation  report  overrates
the  importance  of  the  relationship  of  price  and  income  supports  to  the  problems  of
monopoly and stabilizing  the national  economy and underrates the importance of admin-
istrative  feasibility  and  political  acceptability.
The criteria  given  in this  paper  place  more emphasis  than  does  the  Farm Founda-
tion  report  on  the  relationship  of  price  and  income  supports  to  production  problems
such  as  securing  adequate  production,  optimum  product  combination  (as measured  by
consumer demand  and  production  opportunties),  efficient  production,  and  desired  rate
of conservation.  In a  perfectly competitive  and  stable  economy  with  reasonably  mobile
and divisible factors  these production problems would automatically be solved.  There are
conditions,  however,  such  as  "stickiness"  and  "indivisibility"  of  factors,  elements  of
monopoly  throughout  the  economy,  institutional  barriers,  and  social  goals  conflicting
with the  individual  goals  (i.e.,  stockpiling  for  military purposes),  which  make  it  neces-
sary to  consider production  problems.
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TION  OF  FARM  PRODUCTS.  Efficient  production  requires that  each
producing  unit  combine  the optimum  number  of  enterprises,
use  an  optimum  combination  of  production  factors,  be  at  the
optimum  size,  and  use  the  most  efficient  techniques.  Economic
progress  includes capital  accumulation,  development  and  adop-
tion of new  technology,  and making changes,  including shifting
production  of commodities  between  areas  and  farms  to  reflect
changes  in comparative  advantages  for producing  a commodity.
(4)  ENCOURAGE  PRODUCTION  ADJUSTMENTS  AND  PROVIDE  AS-
SISTANCE  TO  THOSE  ADVERSELY  AFFECTED  BY  TECHNOLOGICAL  AD-
VANCE  AND  GEOGRAPHIC  SHIFTS  IN  PRODUCTION.  Production
adjustments  may  take  the  form  of changes  in the  products pro-
duced,  in  the  factors  used,  in  the  size  of  farm,  or  in  the  tech-
niques used. Assistance  to farmers adversely affected by economic
progress  could be directed  to helping them  either  to reorganize
their farms or to  move  out of agriculture.
(5)  ENCOURAGE  A RATE  OF  CONSERVATION  THAT  IS  CONSISTENT
WITH  THE WELFARE  AND OBJECTIVES  OF SOCIETY  AS  A  WHOLE.  It  is
recognized  that the optimum  amount  of conservation  from  the
standpoint  of  society  may  differ  from  that of  individuals.  The
program  should  serve  the  best  interests  of  society  as  a  whole.
(6)  GIVE  AGRICULTURE  RETURNS  COMPARABLE  TO  THOSE  OF
OTHER  SEGMENTS  IN  THE  ECONOMY. 3 This does  not imply that all
incomes should  be  equal.  It does  mean  that  to  the  extent  that
farmers as  a whole  do their part,  they should earn  incomes com-
parable  to  those  earned  by  other  groups.  It certainly  does  not
imply  that a  public  policy  should  result  in  higher  incomes  for
farmers  than  for other groups.
(7)  BE  POLITICALLY  ACCEPTABLE  AND  ADMINISTRATIVELY  FEAS-
IBLE.  A  program  which  meets  the  other  criteria  might  not  be
politically  acceptable  because  the  methods  for  accomplishing
the program  are  inconsistent with  basic  goals  or institutions  of
society or because they delegate  to administrators responsibilities
usually reserved  to Congress.  Administrative  feasibility  includes
not only  the  accomplishment  of  the  objectives  of the  program
3in  this criterion  it is assumed  that no surplus  labor  resources  are employed  in  agricul-
ture  as  measured  by  economic  yardsticks.  Criteria  two  and  three  require  that surplus
labor  move out of agriculture.
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nance  of  individual  freedom.
(8)  AVOID  MONOPOLISTIC  PRACTICES.  Programs  should  not
restrict  the farmer's  choice  of enterprises,  production  methods,
or  marketing  practices.  Also  monopolistic  practices  which  do
not restrict  the  farmer  but  which  impose  restrictions  on other
groups,  such  as  the  consumer,  in  order  to  benefit  the  farmer
should  be  avoided.
(9)  PROVIDE  SOCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  RETURNS  COMMENSURATE
WITH  THE  COSTS.  The social costs,  such  as the higher prices con-
sumers  may  pay  because  of  restricted  production,  and  social
returns,  such  as the  assurance  of a  plentiful supply  of food,  are
more  important  than  the monetary  costs  and returns,  although
it  is  difficult  to  identify  all  social  costs  and  returns,  much  less
assign  a value  to  them.
(10)  BE  CONSISTENT  WITH  OTHER  POLICIES  OF  THE  COUNTRY.
Price  and  income  support  programs  should  be  consistent  with
such  policies as:  (a)  those which try to prevent serious  inflation
and  deflation,  (b)  those  which  contribute  to  national  defense,
(c)  those  which promote  foreign  trade  and world  economic  co-
operation, and  (d) those promoting accepted goals of the country.
THE  LEVELS  OF  PRICE  AND  INCOME  SUPPORTS
The two main issues in price and income support policies are
the  levels of support and  the  methods  of supporting  prices and
incomes.  Most  work  in  this  field  has  been concerned  with  spe-
cific  programs  which  combine  a  level  of  support  and  one  or
more  methods.  A discussion  of  levels  independent  of  methods
and  vice  versa  should  help  point  up  the  real  problem  areas.
To  this end  this section  is  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  levels  of
support.
While both the levels and methods are important,  if an order
of importance  were  assigned,  first place would  have  to be given
to the levels.  The  importance  of  the  levels  has  to  some extent
been  obscured  until  recently  by  emphasis  being  placed  on
methods  and by a  general  acceptance  of the  belief  that  agricul-
ture  is  entitled  to parity  and  is  not obtaining  it.
High  prices  of  food  during  the  last  few  years,  the  trend
toward  higher  support  prices  (which  has  been  vigorously  op-
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are beginning to bring forth discussion of levels of support.
Those  in  favor  of  high-level  supports  are  saying:  (a)  that
they help prevent deflation;  (b) that they are needed to increase
production;  and  (c)  that they  are  necessary  to  give  farmers  in-
comes  equal  to those  earned  in other segments  of the  economy.
Opponents  of high-level  supports  are saying:  (a)  that they con-
tribute  to  continuous  inflation;  (b)  that  they create  or  at  least
perpetuate  inefficiencies  (specific  inefficiencies  mentioned  are
the  failure  of  low-income  farmers  to  move  out  of  agriculture,
to make geographic  shifts in production,  to  shift from  products
in  low  demand  to  products  in  strong  demand,  and  to  mech-
anize  and  adopt  new  technology);  (c)  that they  cause  the  sub-
stitution of non-agricultural  products  for agricultural  products;
(d) that they cause substitution of one farm  product for another
when  all  products  are  not  supported  at  the  same  high  level;
(e)  that they may  unstabilize  incomes  as there  is  no adjustment
in  price  for  large  and  small  crops;  (f)  that  they  may  increase
income  disparity  (if agriculture  is already  getting more than  its
share);  (g)  that they cause  monopolistic  restrictions  to be  insti-
tuted;  (h) that they lead to production controls and a restriction
of  the  individual  farmer's  freedom;  (i)  that  they  do  not  safe-
guard against  swings of  the  business  cycle;  (j)  that they  reduce
exports  and  are  inconsistent  with  national  policies  to  promote
world trade  and economic  cooperation.  The  arguments  for and
against  low  support  levels  are  roughly  the  converse  of  those
given  for  and  against  high-level  supports.
What  is  the  validity  of  these  arguments?  In  order  that  as
much  light  as  possible  may  be  thrown  on  the  validity  of  these
arguments,  alternative  levels  of  support  are  presented  and  ap-
praised in  the  following sections.
Possible  Levels of Support
At  least  three  widely  different  levels  of  supports  can  be
identified:
(1)  LOW-LEVEL  SUPPORTS,  or  more  specifically  those  sup-
ports that would  be  effective  only in  periods  of general  depres-
sion  and  which  would  cover  only  "out-of-pocket"  costs  of  the
producer  (perhaps  about  50  percent  of  present  parity).
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ports  that  would  keep  farm  prices  and/or  incomes  above  the
levels  which would  prevail  in  a free  market  at all  times except
in those short periods  when demand  is abnormally high in rela-
tion  to  supply  (perhaps  100  percent  of  present  parity  or  the
average  of prices  during the last five years,  whichever  is higher).
(3)  INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL  SUPPORTS,  or more specifically  those
supports  between  the  high-  and  low-level  supports.  Theoreti-
cally,  the  intermediate  supports  could  fall  anywhere  between
the  high-  and low-level  supports.  We  will  assume  that they  are
half way between  the  high and low,  except as otherwise  noted-
i.e.,  75  percent  of  parity.
Appraisal  of Different  Levels  of Support
Economic  models  and  empirical  data  which  the  economist
has at hand are  insufficient  to make a conclusive  appraisal of the
level  of supports.4 The  incomplete  data and  logic which  are  in
the  tool  chest  of  the  economist  will  throw  considerable  light
on  the validity  of  the  various  arguments.  In  this  appraisal  the
consequences  of  high,  low,  and  intermediate  levels  of support
are  compared  with  each  other  and not  with  the  consequences
of no supports. It  is assumed that  if income supports were  used,
the  payments  would  be  based  on production  and  not on  need
or some other welfare criterion.  It is recognized  that the  incom-
plete  logic  and  empirical  data and  choice  of  assumptions  leave
room  for  disagreement  with  the  conclusions.  However,  using
the  available  logic  and  data,  the  possible  consequences  of  the
three  levels  of support  in  relation  to  the  criteria  listed  in  the
previous section  are  given  below.
(1)  STABILIZE  INCOME  AND  PRODUCTION.  High-level  supports
would  not provide  a  high degree  of  income  stability,  although
it  is  granted  that  with  high-level  supports  income  would  be
relatively high every year. Continuous high-level supports would
cause income  to vary  directly with production  and should  help
stabilize  production  and  contribute  to  income  stability.  Until
weather  variations  can  be  controlled,  however,  even  a  reason-
4This points up the need  for further  work in developing  logic  which  explains conditions
in  a  dynamic  world  and  in  gathering  empirical  evidence.  Specific  empirical  evidence
which would be helpful in appraising the levels  of support  are cause  and  effect relation-
ships within  and between  commodities  and elasticities  of supply and  demand.
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tions were  conducted  in connection  with  the  support  program
and if the products could be released,  prices could be prevented
from  rising  above  support  levels  even  during  buying  sprees.
Low-level  supports  would  not  provide  reasonable  income
stability.  They would  decrease  the  range  within which  incomes
could  vary.  The  low-level  supports  would  bring  about  this
decrease  in range  by  preventing  incomes  from  dropping as  low
as  they  would  without  any  supports  and  by  permitting  prices
to rise  in years of  short production.  This condition  would  give
incomes  as  high  as  those  earned  in  years  of  larger  production
and lower  prices.  Low-support  levels  would lead  to "intended"
changes  in  production.  If  these  changes  are  accomplished
quickly,  usually  incomes  are  unstabilized  and  social  waste  is
the result.
Intermediate-level  supports would promise  considerable  sta-
bility of  both  income  and  production,  particularly  if the  level
of support  for individual  commodities  could  be varied.
(2)  ENCOURAGE  A  IRODUCTION  OF  EACH  COMMODITY  WHICH
MEETS  THE  NEEDS  OF  THE  COUNTRY  FOR  THE  COMMODITY  WITH-
OUT  CREATING  A  SURPLUS.  High-level  supports would  tend  to  in-
crease  production  on commercial  farms  by reducing  the  uncer-
tainty,  by  making  a  more  intensive  application  of  factors
profitable,  and by keeping  marginal resources  in  use in agricul-
ture.  Thus  high-level  supports  would  fulfill  this  criterion  only
when  increased  production  is  needed.  Also  if  all  products were
supported  at high  levels,  it  is doubtful  if changes  in technology
and  demand  would  result  in  price changes  sufficient  to  change
the  composition  of  the  total  output.  Of  course,  products  for
which  the  demand  is  strong  and  which  have  not  experienced
technological  advance  could be supported  at  even higher levels
than  other  products.  Such  a  move,  however,  would  probably
conflict  with  the  criterion  of  political  acceptability.  Of course,
shifts  in  production  could  be  obtained  through  production
quotas,  but  this  also would  conflict  with another  criterion.
Low-level  supports  would decrease  production  except  when
demand  is so strong in relation  to supply  that the support level
is  not  even  considered  when  production  decisions  are  made.
If,  however,  the  overproduction  occurs  in  conjunction  with
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economy,  low  support  levels  cannot  be  counted  on  to  prevent
an  overproduction.  LowN  farm  prices,  over  several  production
periods,  plus opportunities  for  expansion  of nonfarm  work  def-
initely should reduce production.  Low-level  supports should not
prevent  changes  in  the  quantities  of  the  various  commodities.
The  effect  of  intermediate-level  supports  on  production
would  be  a  lower  production  than  that  caused  by  high-level
supports,  but a  larger production  than  that caused  by  low-level
supports.  Intermediate-level  supports  should  promote  some
change  in  total  product  composition.  Products  in  strong  de-
mand  would  be  above  the  support  level  except  in  depressions,
and this should cause  an increase  in production  in the commod-
ities in strong demand.
(3)  ENCOURAGE  ECONOMIC  PROGRESS  AND  EFFICIENT  PRODUC-
TION  OF  FARM  PRODUCTS.  High-level  supports  would  encourage
efficiency  in  the  production of farm  products  by  improving  the
farmer's  capital  position  and  by  reducing  uncertainty.  They
would lower  efficiency  by not forcing  marginal  producers  either
to  produce  more  efficiently  or  to  get  out  of  agriculture.  Also
if  production  controls  must  be  instituted  as  a  result  of  high-
level supports,  serious inefficiencies would be created.  The more
important  ones  are  preventing  farmers  from  having  optimum
enterprise  combinations,  preventing  shifts  in  production  from
one area  to another,  and preventing mechanization  due  to keep-
ing  the  scale  of  the  enterprise  small.  The  inefficiencies  created
by  the  high  supports  probably  outweigh  the  added  efficiency
they  bring  about.
Low-level  supports  would  cause  inefficiency  by  increasing
uncertainty  (thus  causing  a  reduction  in  the  application  of
factors  and a slower rate of adoption of new technology)  and  by
preventing  the  substitution  of  capital  for  labor. 5
Intermediate-level  supports would not encourage  inefficiency
to the extent of either high- or low-level  supports. In some  cases,
they  would  be  almost  as  effective  as  high-level  supports  for
reducing uncertainty.
5The  substitution  of capital  for  labor  would  really  depend  upon  relative  factor  prices
rather  than upon  product  prices.  To  the  extent  that  incomes  are  lowered  as  a  result of
low  supports, however,  less  leisure  would  be  preferred and,  therefore,  capital would  not
be  substituted  for labor.
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SISTANCE  TO  THOSE  ADVERSELY  AFFECTED  BY  TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCE  AND GEOGRAPHIC  SHIFTS  IN  PRODUCTION.  High-level  sup-
ports  would discourage  production  adjustments,  particularly  if
all  products  were  supported  at  the  same  relative  level.  There
would  be little  incentive  to  change  the  commodities  produced.
Indeed,  such  changes  might  be  impossible  if  production  con-
trols  were  necessary  due  to  the  high-level  supports.  The  high
supports  would discourage  the  movement  of people out of agri-
culture.  On the  other  hand,  high-level  supports  would  encour-
age  mechanization  (except  in  cases  where  production  controls
prevented  it)  and  would  help  increase  production,  if  that  is
the  adjustment  desired.  High-level  supports  would not  provide
any  direct  aid  and,  indeed,  very  little  indirect  aid  to  persons
adversely  affected  by  technological  advances  and  geographic
shifts  in  production.  High-level  supports  might  well  prevent
sudden  geographic  shifts  in  production  and sudden  technolog-
ical  advances,  working  a  hardship  on some  producers. 6
Low-level  supports  would  encourage  adjustments  except  to
the extent  that increased  uncertainty  and poor capital  positions
would  retard  adjustments.  They  should  encourage  the  move-
ment of resources  out of agriculture.  Low-level  supports  would
not provide  much  assistance  to  those  adversely  affected  by  sud-
den  geographic  shifts or by technological  advance.
A well-designed  system of intermediate  price supports  could
encourage  the  changing  of  products  produced  and  mechaniza-
tion.  They  would  be  less  effective  than  low-level  supports  in
forcing  geographic  shifts  in  production  and  the  movement  of
resources  out of agriculture.  Intermediate-level  supports  would
not provide  assistance  to  those  adversely  affected  by geographic
shifts  or  technological  advance.
(5)  ENCOURAGE  CONSERVATION.  High-level  supports  would
encourage  conservation  by  improving  the  farmer's  capital  posi-
tion  and  by  reducing  uncertainty.  It  has  been  argued,  with
some  justification,  that high  support  levels  have  caused  undue
GIt  is not implied  that supporting  either prices  or incomes  is the  best  way  to  secure  pro-
duction  adjustments  or  that other  programs  could not  be used  to  solve  the  adjustment
problem.  Price  and  income  support  programs  should  do  their  part,  however,  toward
solving the adjustment  problem  and at  least not be inconsistent  with programs  designed
to encourage  adjustments.
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tion  has  been  due,  however,  to  uncertainty  and  to  a  convic-
tion  that  high  prices  were  not  here  to  stay.  If  allotments  are
necessary  due  to  high  supports,  conservation  might  also  be
encouraged.
Low-level  supports  would  not  encourage  conservation.
Intermediate  levels would fall in between high and  low sup-
ports with  regard  to  conservation.
(6)  GIVE  AGRICULTURE  RETURNS  COMPARABLE  TO  THOSE
EARNED  IN  OTHER  SEGMENTS  OF  THE  ECONOMY.  High-level  sup-
ports  would  undoubtedly  increase  farmers'  incomes  over  a
period  of  years.  With  the  inelastic  demand  facing  most  farm
products,  the  decrease  in  consumption  would  not  be  great
enough  to  offset  the  increase  in  income gained  through  higher
prices.  When  farm  incomes  are  low  relative  to  those  of  other
segments  of  the  economy,  high  support  levels  fulfill  this  cri-
terion.  Available  data  indicate  that high support  levels  are  not
necessary  today  to insure  large producers  an income  equivalent
to  those  earned  in  other  segments  of  the  economy.  High-level
supports  are  not  effective  in  raising  the  incomes  of subsistence
farmers.
Low-level  supports  would  affect  the  farmer's  income  posi-
tion only in case  of very low  prices.  The  inelastic demand plus
the  probability  of  heavy  increases  in  production  due  to  pro-
pitious  weather  could  result  in  a  sharp  drop  in  income  when
low-level  supports  are  in  effect.  The  drop  might  be  so  great
that  even  if  farmers'  incomes  were  equal  to  or  above  those
earned  in  other  segments  of  the  economy,  only  the  most  effi-
cient farmers would  receive  incomes  as high  as  those  earned  in
other segments  of the economy.
Intermediate-level supports would fall between high and low
supports  with regard  to  effect  on  income.  If  the  intermediate-
level supports could be varied within substantial  ranges between
the high and low supports, they would fulfill the criterion almost
every  year  for commercial  farmers.  No  level  of support  would
fulfill  this criterion  for the subsistence  farmer.
(7)  BE  POLITICALLY  ACCEPTABLE  AND  ADMINISTRATIVELY
FEASIBLE.  High-level  supports  would  not  be  politically  accept-
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trative  feasibility  is  more  important  in  connection  with  the
method  than  with  the  level  of  support.  High-level  supports
would create more administrative  problems,  however,  than low-
level supports.
Low-level  supports  also  are  not  politically  acceptable  to
farmers  and  probably  not  to  society.  This  is  proved  by  the
testimony  at  any  Congressional  hearing  on  price  and  income
supports.  Serious  administrative  difficulties  are  encountered
with  low-level  supports  because  the  program  would  be  ineffec-
tive  at  times,  causing  wide  variations  in  personnel  and  facili-
ties needed.
Intermediate-level  supports  are  both  politically  acceptable
and  administratively  feasible.
(8)  PERMIT  THE  MAXIMUM  AMOUNT  OF  FREEDOM  IN  PRO-
DUCING  AND  MARKETING.  High-level  supports  would  restrict  the
farmer's  freedom  unless  there  is  a  demand  for maximum  pro-
duction  of  almost  all  commodities.  Assuming  there  is  not  a
demand  for  maximum  production,  high-level  supports  would
result  in one  or  more  of  the  following  monopolistic  practices:
over-all  decreases  in production due  to prices being above  those
determined  in  a  free  market,  production  controls  in  the  form
of  acreage  allotments  or  marketing  quotas,  two-price  systems,
specifying  markets  and  marketing  practices  to be  used,  dump-
ing,  and  destroying  products  to  capitalize  on  inelasticity  of
demand.  It should not be overlooked  that there  is considerable,
and  probably  an  increasing,  amount  of  monopoly  throughout
the  economy.  Although  some  people  deplore  this  fact  and  rec-
ommend  that  agriculture  set  a  pattern  by  going  against  this
trend, it is not at all clear that such a move is possible or feasible,
or even desirable. The institutional framework in which agricul-
ture operates cannot  be ignored  or  treated  lightly when  policy
recommendations  are being made.
Low-level  supports  would  avoid  most of  these  monopolistic
practices.  However,  production  controls  and/or  marketing
7This appears  to  be in  conflict with action  taken  by the 81st  Congress.  Congress was  con-
sidering  only  a  few  commodities,  however,  and  considerable  political  hay  was  made  of
the  war in  Korea.  The  picture  might  have  been  different  if  all  commodities  had  been
considered  and  there had been  no emergency.
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of a depression.
Intermediate-level  supports would be  between high and low
levels  with  regard  to  effect  on avoiding  monopolistic  practices.
(9)  MAKE  COSTS  COMMENSURATE  WITH  RETURNS. 8 It  is  gen-
erally  accepted  that  the  monetary  costs  of  high-level  supports
would  exceed  returns.  The  social  returns,  such  as  assurance  of
plenty  of  food,  increased  conservation,  and increased  efficiency,
however,  may  more  than  offset  the  monetary  and  social  costs
such  as  high  prices,  income  instability,  and monopolistic  prac-
tices  and  thus  make  high-level  supports  desirable.
The monetary  returns from low-level  supports would almost
certainly  exceed  costs.  Social  costs  of  such a  program,  however,
may  far  exceed  returns.
Intermediate-level  supports would fall between high and low
supports with respect  to costs and returns.
(10)  BE  CONSISTENT  WITH  OTHER  POLICIES.  High-level  sup-
ports are  inconsistent  with the  country's  foreign policies-both
economic and political  (except when high production  is needed
to help  feed  the  world.)  High-level  supports  are  generally  con-
sistent with  the  basic  economic  policies  of stabilizing  the  econ-
omy  at  a  high  level  and  of  guaranteeing  every  person  a  fair
standard of living.  It has  been argued with  some logic  that high
supports unstabilize  the economy  by stimulating  inflation when
this  is  not  the  desired  end;  but there  is  considerable  evidence
to indicate  that  this is  not the  case.  By stimulating  production,
high-level  supports could  be deflationary  in  an inflationary situ-
ation.  Also  assuming  that  high-level  supports  do  cause  monop-
olistic  practices  to  be  established,  they  conflict  with  the  basic
goal  of individual  freedom  in our  society.
Low-level  supports  would  not be  inconsistent  with  foreign
policies, but they would be inconsistent with domestic economic
policies  (to  the  extent  that  high-level  supports  are  consistent).
Low-level  supports  could  conflict  with  the  goal  of giving  every
person a fair standard  of living.
Intermediate-level  supports  would  be  varied  and  could  be
made  consistent with most of our major policies.
SOpinions must  be relied  upon almost  altogether  in this case.  Neither  logic nor  the em-
pirical  data that are  available  are very  helpful.
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Once  the  level  of  support  is  determined,  the  question  of
method  arises.  The  major  methodological  considerations  hinge
around:  (1)  the  method  of  computing  the  support  levels,  and
(2)  the  method  of  obtaining  and  maintaining  any  given  sup-
port  level.
The  two  considerations  are  discussed  in  the  section  which
follows.  The  ten  criteria  previously  listed  are  not used  to  ap-
praise  the  several  methods  as  many  of  the  criteria  are  not
directly applicable.
Methods  of  Determining  Support  Levels
In  this  section  different  methods  for  determining  support
levels  are presented  and discussed.
Although each  has  numerous  variations,  there  appear  to  be
two  major ways  of arriving at  support  levels.  The  first  method
involves  adjusting  prices  in  some  past  period  to  present  condi-
tions  by  some  index  of  prices  paid  by  farmers.  Prices  deter-
mined  by  this  method  will  be  called  parity  prices  in  the
discussion  that  follows.  The  second  method  involves  adminis-
trators or the Congress setting support prices without reference to
past relationships.  Expected conditions  in the future and present
conditions  would be  the determinants  of the support  price.  The
prices  arrived  at  by  the  second  method  will  be  called  forward
prices  in  this  paper.  This  is  really  a  misnomer,  however,  as
forward  prices  strictly  speaking  refer  to  prices  that  are  an-
nounced  before  the  production  cycle  starts  rather  than  to  a
method  of determining  prices.  Even prices  computed  under the
first  method  could  be  forward  prices.  The  second  method  calls
for  setting support  prices  which,  except  in  depression  periods,
would call forth  a volume  of production  in the longer run suffi-
cient  to fill  the anticipated  needs  for the  product.  In  depression
periods support  prices would be established  which would  boost
the  sagging  economy.  Although  schedules  of  forward  prices
have  not  been  computed,  proponents  of  forward  prices  leave
the  impression  that  forward  prices  would  be  lower  than  parity
prices.  This raises  a question  as  to whether  the real  issue  is  not
the support  level rather  than the  method.
Several criticisms  have  been made of parity prices.  The criti-
cisms  have  been  directed  in  particular  at  parity  prices  which
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been  made  are  as  follows:
FIRST,  parity  prices  do not  necessarily  give  farmers  incomes
equivalent  to  those  earned  in  nonfarm  employment,  which  is
the real goal of parity  prices.  For parity prices  to insure  farmers
the income goals,  farmers must have  incomes equivalent  to those
earned in other segments of the economy during the base period.
Also  there  must  not be  technological  advance,  or  technological
advance must be at the same rate in all segments of the economy,
the demand  for products must remain the same for all products,
and the same percent of total resources  must be employed in all
segments  now as during the base  period for  parity prices  to give
parity  income  today.  All  of  these  conditions  certainly  do  not
prevail.
SECOND, parity prices  reflect demand and technology  existing
during some  past  period. This condition  could result in  several
undesirable consequences.  It could cause resources  to be devoted
to  the  production  of  one commodity  which,  in  the  absence  of
support  prices,  would  be  devoted  to  the  production  of  some
other  commodity.  For  example,  technological  advances  since
1910-14  in  the  production  of  wheat  have  lowered  the  cost  of
production.  In view of the relative  declining demand for wheat,
the lower production costs, and the inelasticity of demand, wheat
prices  should  drop,  which  would  cause  resources  to  be  moved
from  the  production  of  wheat  to  some  other  commodity  in
stronger  demand.  Support  prices,  based  on  the  period  preced-
ing the technological  improvement  and the  decrease  in demand
for  wheat,  have  not  permitted  wheat  prices  to  fall  and  have
made  wheat  production  very  profitable.  Parity  prices  have  en-
couraged  resources  to  be  devoted  to  wheat  production  rather
than  the  converse,  which  is  the  desirable  course.  The  support
prices  based  on  1910-14  conditions  have  also  given  the  wheat
farmers  large  incomes-probably  larger  than  those  earned  by
other groups of farmers and persons employed in nonfarm work.
It is doubtful if  a public program  should  raise  incomes  for one
group above those earned  by other groups  and at the expense  of
other groups. Further,  it is doubtful  if such a  program would be
tolerated  by society  if this were  its  intent.
THIRD,  as parity  prices  are  partially  based  upon  prices  paid
by  farmers,  farm  prices  do  not  fall  if  a  general  overproduction
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sectors.  This would  prevent,  or at  least  retard,  the  movement
of  resources  out  of  agriculture,  which  is  the  course  of  action
clearly  indicated  by prosperity  in nonfarm  sectors  but overpro-
duction  and  low  prices  in  the  farm  sector.
FOURTH,  when prices are used as goals as is the case  in parity
prices,  the  underlying  maladjustments,  which  ar.  normally  re-
flected in prices,  are hidden.  For example,  guaranteeing  90  per-
cent  of  parity  for  cotton  has  done  little  to  solve  most  of  the
major problems  in  the  cotton belt  (i.e.,  small  farms,  low ratio
of capital  to  labor,  etc.)  Yet  90  percent  of  parity,  plus  acreage
controls at times,  have kept these problems  from being reflected
in  prices  and  have  probably  helped  prevent  the  solution  of
these  problems  either  through  normal  price  movements  or  by
programs designed  to solve the major problems.
FIFTH,  the  parity  formula  has  proved  to  be  a  good  tool  for
raising  support  prices  in  general  and  for  keeping  the  support
prices  of some  commodities  higher than  can  be justified.  Since
a formula  is impersonal, little criticism  is invoked when support
prices are raised,  due  to a change  in one factor of the  equation.
Also the formula provides justification  for higher support prices
for  some  commodities  than  either  economics  or ethics  justifies.
It is doubtful if many commodity groups would have the courage
to ask for the benefits  they now receive without a parity  formula
as justification.  The  hearings  before  Congressional  committees
studying price-support  measures  in the  spring of  1952  indicate
that  the  parity  formula  has  been  used  to raise  support  levels.
Most of these criticisms really assume  a high level of support.
Probably  if an  intermediate  level  of  support and certainly  if  a
low  level  of  support  were  in  effect,  for  all  practical  purposes.
the  second,  third,  and  fourth  criticisms  would  not  apply.  In
normal  times  even  with  intermediate-level  supports,  variation
in prices would be sufficient  for changes  in demand and/or tech-
nology  to  cause  a reallocation  of productive  resources.
A  modernization  of  parity,  such  as  that  set  forth  in  the
Agricultural  Act  of  1949,  would  also  help  eliminate  the  criti-
cism  that  parity  prices  direct  resources  into  an  aggregate
production  dictated  by  historical  demand  and  technological
conditions.  For example,  the  parity  price  for wheat  under  the
formula specified in the  1949 act is $2.14 per bushel as compared
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"new"  parity  price  for  beef  was  $21.30  per hundredweight  in
May  1952  as compared  with  an old parity price  of $15.00.  Such
changes should redirect  resources  in a manner  indicated by cur-
rent demand and supply conditions,  particularly  if high support
prices  are  not guaranteed.  If  a flexible  or  sliding support  level,
such  as  that specified  in  the  1949  act,  were  also  put  into  effect
and  most  commodities  were  included,  practically  all  of  the
criticisms  advanced  against  parity  prices would  be overcome.
On  the  other  hand,  parity  prices  have  several  advantages.
FIRST,  they  are  politically  acceptable  and  administratively
feasible. It  is always  desirable  from the standpoint  of an  admin-
istrator  for  his  decisions  to  be  determined  by  a  formula.  At
times  in  the  past and  perhaps  at  times  in  the  future  it will  be
desirable  to support prices at what appear to be very high levels.
Parity  prices  enable  the  administrators  to  establish  high  price
supports.  The administration  can blame  the high price  supports
on an impersonal  formula.  The Congress  is reluctant  to  change
basic  laws  and  besides  if  Congress  finally  does  get  around  to
looking  into  the  matter,  much  of  the  public  cry  against  high
support prices  may have  disappeared.
SECOND,  supports  derived  from  parity  prices  probably  pre-
vent wide and sudden  price changes which might  occur,  if there
were  no price  supports  or  if  support  prices  were  set without  a
formula  because  of  temporary  conditions  such  as  propitious  or
bad  weather  conditions  or  a  sharp  increase  or  decrease  in  ex-
ports. The short-run sharp changes might redirect resources  into
channels which are in conflict with long-run  use of the resources.
Also,  drastic  price  changes  often  result  in  a  loss  to  individuals
and society. A reasonable  amount of price stability must  be con-
sidered  an asset.
There  are several  criticisms  of  forward  prices even  if  a  low
or intermediate  level  of supports  is obtained:
FIRST,  administrative difficulties  arise, and forward  prices  are
probably not politically acceptable.  Difficulties arise with respect
to:  (a)  computing  "equilibrium"  prices,  (b)  having  the  ratios
of  these  "equilibrium"  prices  to  each  other  make  economic
sense,  (c)  preventing  pressure groups  from  influencing  the  for-
ward  price,  and  (d)  obtaining  Congressional  sanction  for  the
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istrators  do  not  have  too  good  a  record  in  predicting  correct
relationships  (primarily  because  of  the  tremendous  amount  of
uncertainty).  Also past experiences  show  that the  Congress does
not  readily  turn  over  policy-making  functions  to  an  adminis-
trative  branch.  It  is  not  clear  that  forward  prices  are  not  as
easily manipulated  to  give higher support  prices  as  the  support
prices derived from a historical parity.  Indeed, under conditions
such as those witnessed in the  last two years,  when a  great effort
was  made  to  stimulate  production,  forward  prices  likely  would
be  above  those derived  from  a  parity  formula.  This  is  not bad
if there is really a need to stimulate production.  However, would
not efforts  be  made  to  maintain  the  high  prices  just  as  efforts
were made in the last Congress  to prevent a shift to a "new"  and
lower  parity?
SECOND,  forward  prices  may  not cause  the desired  allocation
of  resources,  even  though  this  is  their  primary  purpose.  For
example,  let  us  assume  that  wheat  production  should  be  de-
creased  from  1 billion to  700  million  bushels.  Could  a price  be
set  which  would  cause  the  desired  reduction  and  still  be  at  a
high  enough  level  to  accomplish  other  objectives  of  the  pro-
gram  such  as  avoiding  controls  and  giving  a  fair  income  to
wheat  producers?  On  the  other  hand,  assume  that  efforts  are
being made to reduce the output of a large number of commodi-
ties  by  reducing  the  forward  price,  but  that  an  increase  is
needed for broilers and pork. In such a situation  a small change
in  prices  favoring  pork  and  broilers  might  result  in  an  over-
production  of these  commodities.  Even more  serious  difficulties
might be encountered  in case  of a shortage  of milk  and  in case
relatively  higher  prices  were  guaranteed  for  three  to  five  years,
which  would  be  one  production  cycle.  Changes  in  goals  from
the  spring  of  1950  to  date  indicate  what  could  and  probably
would happen  on  a  much  larger  scale  if  a  full-fledged  forward
pricing  program  were  in  effect  and  conditions  remain  as  un-
settled  as they  have  been  for over two  decades.  Such  a  program
could  well  cause  less  stability  in  agricultural  production  and
income  than  is  desirable.
THIRD,  to  work  effectively  forward  prices  require  a  fairly
strong  demand,  a  nonfarm  economy  that  can  absorb  any  re-
sources  liberated  from  agriculture,  and  no  overproduction  of
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period  of  years?  The  experience  of  the  thirties  indicates  that
low  prices  cannot  be  counted  on  to  reduce  output  sharply  in
a  depression.
Forward  prices  have  the  following advantages:
FIRST,  assuming  that  forward  prices  which  make  economic
sense can  be  set,  they would  bring  about  desirable  adjustments
in agriculture.  They should  encourage  production  of the quan-
tity  demanded  at  the  support  level  and  promote  efficiency  in
production.
SECOND,  forward  prices  could  be  useful  for combatting  de-
pressions.  In a  depression  parity  prices would  likely  fall just at
the time they  should be  maintained  or increased.  On  the  other
hand,  forward  prices  could  be  maintained  at  the  depression
level  or even  raised  if such  a  move  were  politically  acceptable.
A dilemma  is faced,  however,  by those  promising  high supports
during  a depression  period.  The  higher  prices  would  probably
stimulate  production  just  when  it  should  be  curtailed.  The
answer  would  be  stimulating  demand  or  directly  reducing
production.
In  the  final  analysis,  the  question  of  whether  modernized
parity  prices  are  more  desirable  than  forward  prices  depends
upon  future  economic  conditions.  If  there  is  full  employment
and  a continuing need for  a large  production  of farm  products,
the  administrative  difficulties  of  forward  pricing  would  prob-
ably  cause  parity  prices  to  be  more  feasible.  If  there  are  likely
to  be serious  depressions,  forward  prices  may  be desirable.
Methods for Supporting  Prices
In  this section  the alternative  methods  for achieving  a given
support  level  are  presented  and  discussed.  The  major  methods
proposed  are  compensatory  payments,  non-recourse  loans  and
purchases, and subsidies  to consumers  to increase demand.  (The
food  stamp  plan,  the  school  lunch  program,  and  the  Inter-
national Wheat  Agreements  are  examples  of  the  last.)
In any  particular  program  a combination  of all  three  meth-
ods  could  be  used.  For analytical  purposes,  however,  they will
be  considered  separately.  Also  it  is  assumed  in  the  discussion
that storage operations  will not be conducted in connection  with
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tions  must  be  conducted  in  connection  with  the  non-recourse
loan and purchase  program.
It  must  be  recognized  that  the  level  also  has  a  bearing  on
method  of supporting  prices.  If the support  level  is  low,  either
method  would  be  used  infrequently.  In  this  discussion  it  is
assumed that the support level  is such that some method of sup-
porting  prices  is  required  frequently.  Several  disadvantages  of
supporting  prices  by  non-recourse  loans  are  listed  below:
FIRST,  the storage  of farm products  tends to create  large  sur-
pluses  which  depress  the  market  in  years  when  supply  is  just
adequate  or  slightly  below  average.  These  surpluses  tend  to
make  the  farmer  permanently  dependent  on  the  government.
Actually pressure  is applied  to prevent the stored products from
being  released  in  years  of  short  supply  so  that  farmers  can
receive  the  benefit  of higher  prices.  If the products  are  not re-
leased,  they ultimately  must  be destroyed  or  dumped  on  some
foreign country.
SECOND,  maintaining  high  prices  through  loans  and  pur-
chases  tends  to  reduce  the  quantity  of  agricultural  products
used,  particularly  by  foreign  countries.  This  could  result  in  a
lower income for agriculture.  If exports  are maintained  in spite
of high support  prices,  devices such  as the  International  Wheat
Agreement  must  be  used  and  some  of  these  devices  would  be
in conflict with other policies of the country.
THIRD, when  perishable  commodities  are supported  by pur-
chases,  there  likely  is a  substantial  loss.  This loss  causes  quite a
stir and jeopardizes the entire program. This situation may make
the program  administratively  unfeasible.
FOURTH,  storage  programs  benefit  the  large  farmer  much
more proportionately  than the  small farmer  as the large  farmer
is  able  to  take  greater  advantage  of  the  program.
FIFTH,  the  total  cost  of  a  storage  and purchase  program  is
quite high. Monetary  costs may not be high,  but the high prices
paid  by  consumers  plus  any  spoilage  or  wastage  of  stored  or
purchased  products  makes  the  total cost  quite  high.
SIXTH,  loans  and purchases  do  not provide even  the  psycho-
logical  guides  that are permitted  with compensatory  payments.
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the free market price for their products.  This fact undoubtedly
would have  some  bearing  on redirecting  resources.
SEVENTH,  loans  and  purchases  make  production  controls
more  likely than  compensatory  payments  as  the  former curtails
demand.  If  production  controls  are  initiated,  inefficiencies  are
created.
Non-recourse  loans and purchases,  however,  are not without
advantages.  Several  advantages  are  listed  below:
FIRST,  storage  and  purchase  operations  contribute  to  the
welfare  of the economy  by  storing products  to  be  used  in  times
of  national  emergency  and  short  supply  and  by  making  pur-
chased  products available  to  school children,  disaster areas,  and
needy  foreign  countries.
SECOND,  storage  and  purchase  operations  have  proved  to  be
politically acceptable and administratively  feasible in the case of
storable  products.  Secretary  of Agriculture  Brannan  agrees  that
these operations  are not administratively  feasible  if all commod-
ities  are  to be  supported. 9
THIRD,  the  monetary  cost  has not proved  too high,  particu-
larly where the  level  is not too  high and in  times of prosperity.
FOURTH,  the  government's  storage  operations,  to  a  certain
extent,  are  taking  the  place  of  private  storage  and  eliminating
the  role  of  speculators.  If the  government's  storage  program  is
more  efficient  than  private  storage,  society  benefits.  The  elimi-
nation of  the  gains  of speculators  and  the distribution  of  these
gains  to producers  and/or consumers  is also  a benefit.
Compensatory  payments  are  not  without  disadvantages  as
indicated  by the following  criticisms:
FIRST,  compensatory  payments  do  not appear  to  be  politic-
ally acceptable  to either farmers or the Congress.  Farmers argue
that their welfare should not be placed in the hands of Congress.
Congressmen  hesitate  to  accept compensatory  payments  because
of  the  high monetary  costs  (although  this  would  depend  to  a
large extent on the  level)  and pressure  from farmers.  There are
9See his  testimony on farm price supports and production  goals before the 82nd Congress.
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sumers  and  industries  that  use  farm  products,  which  would  be
the result of compensatory  payments.
SECOND,  compensatory  payments  do not permit the accumu-
lation of  stocks  to be  used  in  an  emergency  or in  times  of  low
production.
THIRD,  administrative  difficulties  would  be  encountered  as
every  producer  would  be  involved.  Also  determining  the  pay-
ment for each  producer  would be  a tremendous  task.
Compensatory  payments  would have  several  advantages,  the
more  outstanding  of which  are:
FIRST,  the  consumer  would  be  given  a  break.  Of  course,
much  of  the  monetary  cost  would  be  paid  by  nonfarm  con-
sumers,  but  all  would  not  pay  in  proportion  to  the  benefits
received.  The  low-income  consumers  would  be  the  ultimate
beneficiaries.
SECOND,  the  quantity  consumed  both  at  home  and  abroad
should  be  increased.  This  could  result  in  higher  incomes  for
farmers. This should help prevent the  need  for production con-
trols and the resulting  inefficiencies.
THIRD,  efficiency  should  be  increased  by compensatory  pay-
ments  in  several  ways.  The  same  per  unit payment  would  be
made  regardless  of  the  costs  and returns  to  the  individual  pro-
ducer.  This  would  place  a  premium  on  efficient  production.
Also the compensatory  payments would come  as a kind of wind-
fall  profit which  should  help  farmers  accumulate  capital.
FOURTH,  compensatory  payments  would  be  excellent  for
boosting  a  sagging  economy  in  two  ways.  They  would  make,
probably  cause,  deficit  financing  for  the  government  and  also
would  place  more  funds  in  the  hands  of farmers.
FIFTH,  small farmers would benefit  as much proportionately
as  large  farmers  if  they  produced  as  efficiently.  Of  course,  the
large producers would  still receive  the  largest  benefits.
Subsidies to stimulate demand,  particularly those  that stimu-
late foreign  demand and assist  low-income  families,  have  always
appealed  to  farmers.  There  would,  however,  be  several  disad-
vantages  to subsidies:
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consumption would  insure  a  given  price level  at  all  times,  and
it would probably fail to do so at  times when farmers  most need
the  higher prices and  when higher  prices are  desirable  to  boost
a  sagging  economy.  More  specifically,  it  is  doubtful  if  price
and income  elasticity  for  farm  products  within  the country  are
such  that  a  sharp  increase  in  production  could  be  absorbed  at
any  reasonable  price  level,  particularly  if  the  overproduction
occurred  during  a  decline  in  business  activity.  Also  foreign
demand might not be increased substantially  by merely lowering
prices.  Prices  have  too  small  an  effect  on  the  foreign  demand
in  today's  complicated  foreign  trade  picture  to  affect  sharply
the quantity taken  in  the short run.
SECOND,  a  subsidy  to  all  consumers  would  probably  not  be
politically  acceptable  due  to  the  high  monetary  cost  and  objec-
tions  to  subsidizing consumption  for  high-income  families  and
industries  using farm  products.
THIRD,  a subsidy on certain commodities  might be politically
acceptable,  but  this would  place  restrictions  on  an  individual's
choice,  which conflicts  with  the  goal  of maintaining  individual
freedom.
FOURTH,  a subsidy  that would keep  farm prices at  any given
level would be very costly.
There  is  one  argument  in  favor  of  a  general  subsidy  for
domestic  consumption.  The  diets  of  the  country  should  be
improved,  which  in  turn  should  result  in  desirable  conse-
quences. In periods of falling prices  the high financial  cost could
prove to be a  blessing if  it contributed  to  deficit  financing.  It  is
difficult  to  find  an  argument  in  favor  of  a  continuing  subsidy
for foreign consumption.  Of course,  the farmers would be bene-
fited,  but there  should be  a more  direct, effective,  and desirable
means of accomplishing  this end.
Either  non-recourse  loans  and  purchases  or  compensatory
payments  could  accomplish  a given  price level.  In  all  probabil-
ity,  however,  some  combination  of  all  three  methods  would
prove  more desirable  than any  one method.
ALTERNATIVE  PRICE  AND  INCOME  SUPPORT  PROGRAMS
Numerous  alternative  proposals  have  been  made  for  chang-
ing the price and  income  support  programs  now in effect.  Each
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support.  The  more  important  proposals  are  discussed  in  this
section. These proposals will be appraised  by huddle groups.
The  proposals which  will  be outlined  in  this section  are  as
follows:
1. Forward prices and compensatory  payments.
2. National  marketing quotas.
3.  Subsidies for domestic  consumption.
4. Subsidies for export.
5.  Redefined price parities and flexible supports.
6. Parity income.
7.  Income support standards.
8. Full employment parity.
FORWARD  PRICES  AND  COMPENSATORY  PAYMENTS.  Under this
proposal  the  Secretary  of Agriculture  would  announce  support
prices  in  advance  of  the  breeding  or  planting  seasons  for  agri-
cultural products. The support prices would remain in effect for
at least one production  cycle. In periods of full employment,  the
level of each forward price would be determined  with a view  to
calling  forth  a  volume  of  production  in  the  longer  run which
would suffice  to fill anticipated  needs for the product. In periods
of depression,  when prices could not be  set low enough  to clear
the market,  forward prices  of the predepression  period  might be
used.  These  prices would  mitigate  the  effects  of  the  depression
on farmers  and  be useful  in  stimulating  business  in  the  entire
economy.
The  forward  prices  would  be  guaranteed  through  storage
operations  and  compensatory  payments  which  would  make  up
the  difference  between  the  actual  market  price  and  the  prede-
termined support  price. The market  price would be  allowed  to
fall  until  the  market  would  absorb  the  supplies,  and  no  sur-
pluses would develop.
Any over-all  level of supports could be  used under  this pro-
posal. The proponents have in mind an intermediate level when
all commodities  are  considered.  The support  prices  for  individ-
ual commodities  might be quite  low or quite  high.
NATIONAL  MARKETING  QUOTAS.  This proposal  would  tie  for-
ward prices and compensatory payments  to variations  in supply.
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establish forward  prices and compensatory  payments in relation
to  a  national  marketing  quota.  The  level  of  support  for  each
commodity  would  be  set  to  call  forth  the  quantity  specified  in
the  national  marketing  quota  in  normal  years.  In  depression
years  the  level  would  be higher-probably  at  the  predepression
level. This quota would apply  to the crop  as  a whole  and would
not be broken  down  into individual  farm  allotments  or  quotas.
Farmers  would be  expected  to adjust  their production  to varia-
tions in their gross incomes,  and not merely  to variations  in  the
prices and payments  received.  An example  for cotton  will show
how the proposal  is supposed  to  work.
The government would announce,  let us say, a forward price
of  25  cents  on  a  total production  of  twelve  million  bales,  and
thus  guarantee  to  farmers  a  total  gross  income  of  one  billion
five  hundred  million  dollars,  regardless  of  how  much  cotton
each  farmer  would  actually produce.  If  the crop  turned out  to
be fifteen  million  bales,  the  price  guarantee  of  25  cents would
apply  to  only  twelve  fifteenths  of  the  amount  actually  sold  by
each farmer,  and  the government  would  pay  the  difference  be-
tween  the  market  price  and  the  guaranteed  price  only on  that
amount.  Assuming  that  the  market  price  dropped  to  20  cents,
each  producer  would  receive  five  cents  in  compensatory  pay-
ments for  80 percent  of the actual poundage  sold  by him.
The  proposal  for national  marketing  quotas  also  advocates
that farmers  should have  a wide  range  of choices  as  to the  form
in  which  they  would  take  the  compensatory  payments  (called
supplementary  payments  in the proposal).  Instead of being paid
in cash these payments  would be  made  in the  form of grants-in-
aid  to  farmers  for  carrying  out  approved  production  practices,
somewhat  in  the  manner  of  the  agricultural  conservation  pay-
ments  (ACP) of the PMA.  In normal  years  the payments  would
be  directed  largely  toward  helping  farmers  to  carry  out needed
adjustments  in  the  fields  of  production,  marketing,  and  con-
sumption.  If  prices  remained  depressed  over  time,  the  most
important  use of the supplementary payments  would be  in help-
ing  farmers  to  shift  part  of  their  production  to other  lines,  or
even to  get out of  farming altogether.  In  short,  supplementary
payments  would  be  used  to  attack  the  production  and  adjust-
ment problems of particular  farms,  or regions,  or periods.
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ments proposal, any level of support could be used. It is assumed,
however,  for  purposes  of  discussion  that  an  intermediate  level
of support would  be  used.
SUBSIDIES  FOR  DOMESTIC  CONSUMPTION.  Several  proposals
have  been  made  for  subsidizing  domestic  consumption.  The
specific  proposal,  which  will  be  considered,  is  known  as  the
National Food Allotment  Plan.
This plan,  sponsored  for  several  years  by  Senator  Aiken  of
Vermont,  starts  from the  idea that every American,  regardless of
income,  is  entitled  to  a  diet  considered  adequate  by  the  nutri-
tionists.  Low-income  groups  often  cannot  afford  such  a  diet,
even  if  they  spend  a  comparatively  high  portion  of  their  in-
comes,  say  40  percent,  for  food.  The  plan  proposes  to  "subsi-
dize"  the purchasing power of these groups in the following way.
Every  family, regardless  of its  income,  would have  the  privilege
of exchanging 40  percent of its income  for food  coupons  (let us
say,  at  the  post  office).  The  face  value  of  these  coupons  would
equal  the  retail  costs  of  the  adequate  diet.  The  difference  be-
tween  the family's contribution  and the actual  value  of the cou-
pons in retail stores  would  be borne  by  the  government.  People
whose  incomes  were  more  than two and  a half  times the  cost  of
the  adequate  diet,  would  have  little  incentive  to  buy  the  cou-
pons,  since  40  percent  of  their  income  would  be  sufficient  for
paying  the  retail  prices  of the  food  they want.  The  benefits  of
the scheme,  though  available  to everybody, would thus accrue to
those families who would have to spend more than 40 percent of
their  incomes  if  they  had  to  buy  the  adequate  diet  at  normal
retail costs.
This  plan  supposedly  would  keep  farm  prices  at  an  inter-
mediate  level.
SUBSIDIES  FOR  EXPORT.  Two-price  systems  in  the  field  of
foreign  trade  in agricultural  products  are not  intended  to help
consumers  abroad,  but  to  secure  to  the  American  producer
prices higher  than those  prevailing  in the  world market.  Under
proposals  of  this  type,  exporters  would  be  given  a  subsidy  on
the commodity  exported  with  the  expectation  that  they  would
bid up domestic  farm prices  by the  amount of the subsidy.  The
result  would  be  that  the  level  of  prices  received  by  domestic
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would  be  higher  than  the  prices  received  in  foreign  markets.
The crucial  problems  are,  first,  the  amount  of  the  subsidy
per unit, and second,  the  financing of the subsidy.  On the latter
problem,  the easiest solution would seem to be outright payment
by the Treasury. Another proposal, popular during the  twenties
and still a live  issue with some farm organizations,  would finance
the  export  subsidy  by  a  levy  on  the  domestic  producers  and
would figure  its amount from supply conditions.
It will  be  assumed  for  appraisal  purposes  that  the  subsidy
would  be paid  out of  general  funds  and  that it would  achieve
an intermediate  level of support.
REDEFINED  PRICE  PARITY  AND  FLEXIBLE  SUPPORTS.  This  pro-
posal was  part of the  so-called  Aiken  Bill  (Title II  of the  Agri-
cultural  Act of  1948).  The  principal  points of the  original  ver-
sion were:
(1)  To bring the  parity-price  formula  up  to  date  by  basing
it  on  the  most  recent  ten-year  average  of  prices  received  by
farmers.
(2)  To  announce  price-support  levels  in  advance  of  the
planting  season.
(3)  To support price  levels  through non-recourse  loans  and
direct purchases  as in the present  programs.
(4)  To  make  support  price  levels  vary  with  supply  condi-
tions.  When  expected  supplies  are  thought  to  be  in  line  with
anticipated  demand,  prices  would  be  supported  at  a  predeter-
mined  level,  say  at  75  percent  of parity.  When supplies  are  ex-
pected  to be larger than demand,  the  support level  would move
down by  a certain percentage,  and vice  versa.
(5)  Originally,  the minimum  support level  of 60  percent  of
parity  was  thought to  be  sufficient  for bringing supplies  in  line
with demand. As an afterthought,  however,  it was proposed that
in  cases  of  severe  market  gluts,  such  as  are  caused  by  business
depressions  or chronic  oversupplies,  production  controls  should
be resorted to in the form of marketing quotas. If farmers agreed
to  those marketing  quotas,  they  would  receive  higher  support
prices  than otherwise.
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and put to work,  they would always disturb the function of price
changes  as  directives  for  production  adjustments.  It  has  been
advocated,  therefore,  that  price-support  standards,  as  based  on
parity,  be discarded  in  favor  of income-support  standards.  The
proposal  would  get away  from  the  support  of  individual  com-
modities  and  would  support  farm  income  regardless  of  what
commodities  would enter  into  the  sales receipts  of the  individ-
ual  farm.  At  the  same  time,  the  proposal  would  not  need  his-
torical  bases  for  determining  the  income  standards.  Instead,  a
certain  ratio  of  the  per capita  farm  income  to  the  per  capita
income  of the  nonfarm  population  would be  used  as a  measur-
ing stick. The method of executing the  program  is as follows:
(1)  When  prices  are  too  low  to provide  the  average  farmer
a  "fair"  share  of  the  national  income,  the  total  farm  income
should  be  increased  by supplementary  payments  from  the  gov-
ernment. The  percentage  by which  the  farm  income  should be
increased  would be determined  by the relationship between  the
per capita  income  of farmers and  the per capita  income  of non-
farm  people.
(2)  The  same  percentage  payment  should  be  made  to  all
farmers.  The  primary  purpose  of  this  method  is  not  to  inter-
fere with  the  influence  of  price  changes  upon  redirecting  agri-
cultural production.
(3) The distribution of the payments among individual  farm-
ers  would  depend  upon  their  incomes  for  the  year.  As  a  basis
for payments the  farmer's total cash receipts  would be used,  but
purchases  of feed and livestock would be deducted because  these
latter are  not contributions of  the  individual  farm.
It  is  assumed  that  this  proposal  would  try  to  give  over-all
incomes  similar  to those  resulting  from  high-level  supports.
INCOME  SUPPORT  STANDARDS.  The  widely  discussed  program
associated with the name of Secretary of Agriculture,  Charles  F.
Brannan,  in  fact  is  a  combination  of  several  proposals  which
have  already been covered.  The significance  of the  program lies
in the attempt to combine  these  features  in such a way that they
appeal  to several  politically  potent groups  all at  once.
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(1)  Price parities would  be  discarded  in favor  of an over-all
income  standard which would  be figured  from the  cash  receipts
of  farmers  for  the  average  of  the  immediately  preceding  ten
years.  The  level  of  price supports  would  be  derived  from  that
standard,  the  percentage  difference  by  which  prices  should  be
higher being the  same for all  commodities.
(2)  Commodities  to  be  supported  would  comprise  a  list  of
all the  important  items  sold by all  farms.
(3)  The support method would be  the  same for the  storable
commodities  as under the present  program. For perishables,  the
plan  would  advocate  the  use  of  compensatory  payments.  This
is the  most  conspicuous  feature  of  the  program.
(4)  Producers  would be  eligible  for  the  benefits  of  the  sup-
port  program  if:  (a)  reasonable  soil conservation  practices were
carried  out,  (b)  controls  were  complied  with when  necessary  to
keep supplies  down and when approved  by farmers,  and  (c)  the
total sales volume  of the  farm did not exceed  a certain  limit.
This  program  definitely  proposes  high-level  supports.
FULL  EMPLOYMENT  PARITY.  The  basic  idea  of  the  full-em-
ployment parity  would be to  guarantee  farmers at least  as much
income  as  they would  get if  the  economy  were  fully  employed.
The parity would be computed by:
(1)  Determining the average  percentage  of the total national
income which  farmers  actually  received  as  cash  income  during
the most recent  five-year  period.
(2)  Determining  the minimum amount  of gross  national  in-
come  necessary  to  maintain  reasonably  full  employment  and  a
sound economy  for the coming year.
(3)  Multiplying the  percentage  arrived at  in step  (1)  by the
national income arrived  at in step  (2)  to obtain gross parity cash
income  for  agriculture.
(4)  Comparing  the  gross  parity  cash  income  arrived  at  in
step  (3) with  the average  actual  cash  farm  income  for the  most
recent five-year  period.  If actual is  less  than the gross parity cash
income,  the percentage  difference  should be computed.
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(4) by the average  individual commodity price prevailing during
the five-year  period  to get the desired  parity price for  each  com-
modity.  This would give the  parity prices.
Price would be supported by compensatory  payments  on the
part of the crop used for domestic  production.
A high  level of support would  be  intended  by the  program.
RESOURCE  USE  AND  FARM  PRICE
AND  INCOME  PROGRAMS
By Harold  G.  Halcrow
It is the objective in this paper to briefly discuss farm income
and  resource  programs  within  a  broad  setting,  not  confined  to
direct  price  and  income  supports  but  including  general  prob-
lems of resource  allocation and efficiency  in a long-range  setting.
Moreover, it  is the objective  to outline how these questions  may
be  placed  before  a  general  farm  audience  in  a  meeting where
agricultural  policy  is under discussion. The outline may  be pre-
sented  in a variety of ways but is  perhaps best presented  by giv-
ing the broad setting and objectives of agricultural policy before
turning to the  discussion of programs and  means.
THE  SETTING  FOR  FARM  INCOME  AND  RESOURCE  PROGRAMS
Two  main  topics,  (1)  farm  production  and  efficiency  and
(2)  the  level  and stability  of farm  income,  are  described  as  the
major  parts  of  the  setting.  These  are  presented  as  the  income
and resource  problems with which  policy attempts  to deal. The
following  topical  heads  are  suggested  as  a  basis  for  discussion:
1.  FARM  PRODUCTION  AND  EFFICIENCY
a. General  efficiency  and  productivity  of  agriculture  in  the
United States.
b. The range  of efficiency  in agriculture-with  discussion  of
underemployment,  size  of  farm,  and  capital  allocations  asso-
ciated with the range in efficiency.
c. Relationships  of capital, farm size,  and uncertainty to pro-
duction  efficiency.
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